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EXECUTIVE SESSION

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 3370, House Annex No. 2, 2nd and D Streets, N.W.

Present: Michael Goldsmith and Dan Hardway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Miss Reporter, will you please swear in the witness?

The Reporter. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Scelso. I do.



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TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please state your name for the record?

Mr. Scelso. John Scelso.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you spell Scelso?

Mr. Scelso. S-c-e-l-s-o.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your present occupation, Mr.

Scelso?

Mr. Scelso. I am retired.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where do you live?

Mr. Scelso. Abroad.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso, are you here testifying before the Committee voluntarily and without subpoena?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you been given a copy of the Committee rules and the Committee resolutions?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that rule?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that you have a right to have counsel present here today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you waive that right?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I am an attorney myself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the Committee's rules that you have a right to receive a copy of the transcript of the deposition statement that you are about to give today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you willing to waive that right/

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I waive that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I gave you, a few minutes ago, a copy of a letter written by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Carlucci, to this Committee. It is in the Committee's record as Exhibit 94, JFK Exhibit 94.

Have you had a chance to read that letter?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it?

Mr. Scelso. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of the record, I would like to explain to you that the Committee's mandate is to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy in terms of who killed the President. Was there a conspiracy? What was the performance of the investigative agencies, including the FBI and the CIA? Also to evaluate the work of the Warren Commission. Do you understand that?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso, is it true that you were



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formerly	employed	рÀ	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency?

Yes, I was. Mr. Scelso.

For how many years were you so employed? Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Scelso. Twenty-three years.

In what capacity? Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Scelso. I was an intelligence officer in the clandestine operations side of the organization.

Mr. Goldsmith. For all twenty-three years?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, all twenty-three years.

Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you have with the Agency at the time you retired?

Mr. Scelso. At the time I retired, I was on the foreign intelligence staff in charge of the operations branch responsible for reviewing almost all of the foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations of the Agency and of formulating doctrine with the conduct of such operations.

I was also a member of a panel which reviewed the total programs of the Agency abroad and evaluated them.

Of course, at the time of the Kennedy assassination, I had quite another job.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. What was your position?

At the time of the Kennedy assassination, Mr. Scelso. I was the chief of a branch responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America, down to and including Panama.



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Mr. Goldsmith. Which branch was that?

Mr. Scelso. I think it was called WH-3, Western Hemisphere 3. The designations change from time to time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you discussed with anyone from the Agency the testimony you are going to be giving here today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I was acquainted, very briefly, with the general thrust of the Committee's investigation, which is as you have summarized it to me today.

I was made aware of the Nosenko case, and I borrowed Mr. Epstein's book and read it over the week-end. That is all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any involvement in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Scelso. No. I knew of the Nosenko case in a very sketchy way. I knew that Nosenko had defected and that he had said that Oswald was not a Soviet agent.

I later heard that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level. That is all. That information was imparted to me by officers I do not recall in no more than three sentences on the first occasion and two sentences on the second occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any particular reason, then, that you read the Nosenko book this week-end?

Mr. Scelso. Just that I am very much interested in the Kennedy assassination investigation and it seemed to present a

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lot of new angles.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you think that you might be asked questions about the Nosenko case?

Mr. Scelso. I suspected that I might.

Incidentally, the book did raise several points in my mind which I would like to discuss with you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we do that, other than the general briefing that the Agency gave you on the work of our Committee, did anyone in the Agency suggest to you that you should not not cooperate with us?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone inform you about the substance of other interviews or statements made under oath by Agency employees to staff of this Committee?

Mr. Scelso. No, except that I was told in a discussion of the Nosenko case that certain people in the Agency had testified along one side or the other of the Nosenko case.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were not informed about the substance of any statements made by any CIA person to this Committee?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we proceed, you indicated that you would like to give us some background information or comments on the Nosenko case from the book you have read. Why do you not take this opportunity to do that now?

Mr. Scelso. Well, several points struck me. As you know,



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I was in charge of the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy for the clandestine services of CIA, of which Mr. Helms was then the Chief for the first one or two months, and I learned a lot about the case at that time, read hundreds of papers and a summary report, before I was relieved of this responsibility.

In reading the book, the Epstein book, I noted a couple of things. One is that the Embassy officer in Moscow who talked to Oswald when he arrived there and wanted to renounce his citizenship, a man named Schneider, was stated to be an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If this is true, I did not know it at the time of my investigation and must conclude that the information was withheld from me, because I discussed the Oswald case with members of the Soviet Branch at that time, in the presence of an officer who had been in Moscow at the time of the Oswald defection.

In this conversation where I was reading the State Depart ment reports written by the officer who had seen Oswald, I was not told that this man was a CIA agent, CIA officer, or whatever he was.

I only know that the book I do not know that he was. said that he was.

Secondly, the book states that Oswald had been in touch in Dallas or Houston or someplace with the CIA Office of

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Operations Officer, Contacts Branch, named Moore -- M-o-o-r-e.

J. Walter Moore? Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Scelso. Something like that.

J. Walton Moore was in touch with deMohrenschielt. asserts that deMohrenschielt claimed Moore had asked him to stay in touch with Oswald.

As I recall, I did not know that Moore had, any officer of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Texas area, had been in touch with Lee Harvey Oswald at any time.

Mr. Goldsmith. My recollection differs somewhat. recollection of the book was that it said that Moore had been in touch with deMohrenschielt. I do not think it went into any detail that Moore had been in touch with Oswald.

Mr. Scelso. I read the book very hurriedly, and I thought they were the same party, however, I cannot swear to I just wanted to say that I did not know that there had ever been any involvement between the domestic branch of the Central Intelligence Agency that was then called the Office of Operations and their offices around the states, who interviewed American servicemen going abroad or returning I did not know from abroad, was called the Contacts Branch. that anyone in that branch had ever been in contact with the Oswald case, whether with him personally or by requesting people to elicit information from him, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that surprise you?



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Mr. Scelso. Yes, because that should have shown up in the traces and it was, of course, a vital factor in the investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. When I say does that surprise you, does the fact that no officer from the domestic contacts division, or domestic contacts service, ever contacted Oswald? Does the fact of the absence of such a contact surprise you?

Mr. Scelso. No, it would not have surprised me, because Oswald was a security suspect and was a proper subject for handling by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, not with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are youssaying, then, that it would not be standard operating procedure for the Agency to attempt to debrief a returning defector?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know, really, because the operations of the Soviet Branch was something that was very, very exclusively held which I, in my later positions, when I had to review all of the operations in the world and so on, very rarely found out anything about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to state that Dan Hardway has just walked into the room.

Dan, this is Mr. Scelso.

Mr. Scelso. I know that positively I did not know that Schneider was a CIA man, if he were; and as far as I recall --



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and I have never nead any of the files since. I was relieved back in early 1964 of the responsibility for the investigation --I do not recall anything about Moore or any CIA direct or indirect contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Oswald was in Russia, he worked at a radio factory for quite some time. Would that fact have made the Agency more interested in interviewing him upon his return?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, it should have, normally -- and I am just conjecturing now; I do not actually know what the policy of the Office of Operations was about interviewing security suspects in the United States, an obvious suspect like an exdefector.

Mr. Goldsmith. Should there be a statement in Oswald's file that the reason he is not being interviewed or debriefed is that he would fall into the proper jurisdiction of Office of Naval Intelligence or the FBI?

Mr. Scelso. On the basic of logic you would think so, but I do not know anything at all about standard operating procedures of the Office of Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Office of Operations --

-- was a branch of the Central Intelligence Mr. Scelso. Agency which maintained offices around the United States and briefed and debriefed Americans going abroadd and returning from abroad.



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Mr. Goldsmith. That was now called the Domestic Contacts Service? the amounth of the total ?

Mr. Scelso. Something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you were present at a conversation where there was a CIA officer present who was in Moscow when Oswald was there?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was that officer?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Hugh Montgomery.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this conversation take place?

Mr. Scelso. I presume it was sometime within two months after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Montgomery ever had any contact with Oswald in Moscow?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that, no. When I talked to him, he wondered whether he might not have been present at one of the interviews.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which interview are you referring to?

Mr. Scelso. The interview of the State Department officer who wrote these reports we were going over with Lee Harvey Oswald, and then he reflected on this a minute and said no, he was not, because there were other defectors at the time, you know, before or afterwards.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Montgomery make any other comments about the Oswald case?



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Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you had no knowledge whether or not Mr. Schneider was a CIA officer; if he was would his file reflect that?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that his file would not indicate his active employment with the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. His files in the State Department?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's talk first about his files with the CIA.

Mr. Scelso. I do not know whether we would have a file at the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me run this hypothetical with you.

Assume that a man works for the Central Intelligence
Agency, 1949 for a year, and he leaves and joins the Foreign
Service, becomes a Foreign Service Officer. Eventually he
gets assigned to work in the Soviet Union as a consular
officer.

His CIA file, let's assume that during this time that the man is working State Department cover but he is also CIA. Would the CIA file necessarily reflect the fact that he is still working for the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure. There would be a file in the Office of Personnel that would show his entire CIA record and the fact that he was put under State Department cover.

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That file would probably be very closely held, even more closely held than ordinary files.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that indication that he is under State Department cover, but still with the Agency, would that be in the subject's main personnel file, or is it possible that it would be in some other file?

Mr. Scelso. I really cannot answer that authoritatively, because I never saw the file of any officer who was stationed in Moscow. The assignment of CIA officers to Moscow was something that was very elaborately prepared, planned in advance, and very closely held.

For example, I was once stationed in an Embassy abroad where there was an officer, CIA officer, who was just in to go to Moscow as his next assignment. I did not know that this man was a CIA officer at all, even though I was, for a considerable period, Acting Chief of the station.

I did not know that this man, whom I saw occasionally and who often I had occasion to deal with, he was a State Department Security Officer. I did not know he was a CIA man, until he got thrown out of Moscow later on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this Mr. Angelli?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I think that was his name.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible for the Agency to work with an officer overseas without there being any notation in the officer's personnel file at CIA Headquarters -- in other words,



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a personnel file would indicate, for example, that the employee retired back, say, in 1955. No connection whatsoever with the Agency after 1955, and for only a handful of people to know that actually the person is still CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Certainly it is possible. As I say, I do not really know the mechanics and the administrative procedures that accompanies such an assignment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any aspect of the Oswald case that struck you as unusual when you first had an opportunity to first read through the file?

Mr. Scelso. Do you mean after the assassination?

Yes. Did you read the file any time before Mr. Goldsmith. the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then after the assassination.

Mr. Scelso. We only had a scan file on Oswald until he was involved in the assassination, merely the fact that he had been in the Marine Corps and had deserted, and we learned about this in reports from the Navy and State Department, and we had made agrecord, I think, a think file of the communications on him from other government agencies.

And of course it was the information that had come up from Mexico City a few weeks before the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the file was limited in nature, but even in light of what little material that was in



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24 25 it, was there anything in there that you found unusual?

Mr. Scelso. Not to me, because, for many years, I had been dealing with cases like this and people like this and, to me, it was just a typical defection case.

You see, one of the other things I was in the Agency, early on, I was the first polygraph operator in the Agency and had polygraphed some hundreds of security suspects. also had been a prisoner of war interrogator in World War II and interrogated some tens of thousands of Germans; and I also had been the counterespionage officer for the European Division back in the '50's and dealt with dozens of defection cases and things like that.

So Oswald just seemed to me to be a small potatoes defector.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the Agency's standard operating procedure with dealing with a defector that returns into the country?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know. By the time that defectors started coming back, I was no longer in a position to know that kind of thing. People like that were handled, of course, primarily by the FBI or, if there were military defectors, also by their branch of service. And I was overseas for many years, from '52 to '62 -- wait a minute; '55 to '62 -and no case like that had ever come to my attention.

I was not in a position where things came across my desk.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald defected to the Soviet Union in October, 1959, and early November of '59, the CIA received a cable or a copy of a cable from either the Office of Naval Intelligence or from the Department of State, I do not recall exactly which.

The substance of the cable reported Oswald's visits to the American Embassy in Moscow and indicated that Oswald said that he was going to defect and also that Oswald was going to offer military-related information to the Soviets.

As I said, that cable came in at the beginning of November, 1959. Under normal operating procedure, should that cable have triggered the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Scelso. Again, I really cannot authoritatively speak about procedures. I would imagine so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, would it be unusual for Oswald's 201 file to have been opened over a year after the arrival of that cable? In other words, the file actually was not opened until December, 1960, over a year after the defection.

Would you regard that as unusual?

Mr. Scelso. I cannot tell. I never concerned myself with procedures like that. When I came back from overseas,

I was put into running a great big branch with revolutions going day and night, and I had a large staff of extremely capable people who concerned themselves with things like that.



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Mr. Goldsmith. We will get back to your work on this case after the assassination in a while. What I would like to do now is go over a series of cables and transcripts pertaining to the period before the assassination.

For the record, I would like to say that all of my questions pertain to the time period of late 1963.

In 1963, you were Chief of the Division known as WH-3?
Mr. Scelso. Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Branch known as WH-3?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what connection, if any, did you have with the Mexico City Station at that time?

Mr. Scelso. The Mexico City Station was directly under my branch. I had a branch and a series of desks under that.

One of them was the Mexico desk.

I was, first in 1962, I was Chief of the Mexico desk itself and then, a year later, I became Chief of the Branch which included Mexico and several other countries.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Chief of Station, Mexico City, for example, be a subordinate of yours?

Mr. Scelso. In a sense, yes, although he reported directly to the Division Chief and to the Director, and so on. Every one of the Station Chiefs abroad has three or four different roles.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the manner in which he reported



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consistent with the manner in which other station chiefs reported to headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. As a matter of fact, Mexico was an absolutely outstandingly managed station and its reporting and conformance to procedures, and so on, was exemplary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Chief of Station, Mexico City?

Mr. Scelso. Winston Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. I guess you have sort of done it, but would -- indirectly -- but could you give us your impression of Winn Scott's competence as a Station Chief?

Mr. Scelso. Winn Scott was, at that time -- probably, in view of my later experience surveying all of the stations in the world, as good as Station Chief as we had, and you could fairly say that he had the best station in the world.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would you say that he had the best in the world?

Mr. Scelso. Because of the breadth and depth of their operations, both in the counter-intelligence field and the political action field, and in the espionage field.

Mr. Goldsmith. What kind of personal relationship, if any, did you have with Mr. Scott?

Mr. Scelso. A fine relationship. He was a great deal older than I was -- not a great deal, but enough, and I had

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the greatest respect for him, and he also treated me with the greatest respect.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you and Mr. Scott ever disagree?

Mr. Scelso. During the course of the investigation,

when letters and cables were flying thick and fast, there

were a few professional points on which we disagreed, but they

were never personal in matters. They were merely differences

of judgment and opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Herb Minnell?

Mr. Scelso. The name is familiar to me, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe Mr. Minnell was case officer in Mexico City, at that time, who was in charge of Soviet Operations.

Mr. Scelso. That's right, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know him?

Mr. Scelso. I do know him, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you give us your opinion of his competence?

Mr. Scelso. I am looking back here now fifteen years and since I have retired in 1970, I have had next to no contact with anybody in the Agency, especially abroad. I remember Mr. Minnell was picked for this job as a very capable and experienced Soviet Operations officer.

However -- in fact, he was personally approved by me,

I believe -- but the standard by which you judged Soviet

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Operacion	officers was an exercisery concretered material
It was li	ce asking Jerry Ford what he thinks of President
Carter, a	ll prejudices aside, what do you think of President
Carter?	It is a very difficult question to answer.

He was certainly not an incompetent, but he was very well thought of and he was the best man for the job.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any opinion as to his honesty and trustworthiness?

Mr. Scelso. I had never had any reason at all to doubt anything about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Mr. Robert Shaw?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Robert Shaw was in the Mexico station.

I recall him. He had been chief of a base up north, I
believe.

And Shaw was a man whose honesty and loyalty I never could question, although he and I disagreed on a number of professional things. I do not recall Mr. Shaw as a particularly solid individual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did any of your disagreements with Mr. Shaw pertain to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the handling of the investigation by the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. No. I do not think I ever discussed that with him, or with the other gentleman that you mentioned.

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24 25 Mr. Goldsmith. How about Mr. David Phillips?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. David Phillips, who has since become related to me by marrying a relative of mine, was regarded by me, long before this marriage, as one of the absolutely outstanding officers of the Agency after I visited Mexico City and reviewed his operations soon after I took over the Mexico desk. I regard this man as one of the most brilliant, capable officers that I have ever known, and nothing has happened since then that has changed my judgment.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about your impression of his honesty, integrity?

Mr. Scelso. Well, having known him through thick and thin in the Mexico station and when he was later head of Cuban operations, I would give him the highest marks. I have never known any man of greater integrity, and few equal, based on my experience.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you known Mr. Phillips in his capacity as a propaganda officer ever sent out disinformation or misinformation concerning the Kennedy Assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No, but I can conceive that it might have happened in the Mexico station. Perhaps they did, in their propaganda efforts which were going full-blast all the time, put in newspaper articles and so on to discredit somebody, some foreign power, in connection with the operation. I do not believe that it was ever a policy to do so, but they were

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pretty much independent in formulating their propaganda.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know a woman named Ann Goodpasture?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, but not intimately, not well. I knew her when I visited the Mexico station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what her responsibilties were in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. She was sort of the personal assistant to Winn Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any opinion as to her?

Mr. Scelso. She was very capable, extremly hardworking.

A very loyal person. As far as I know, she has the highest reputation -- recognizing the fact, of course, that there were people in the Mexico station who did not like the Station Chief and did not like any part of his hierarchy, because Winn Scott was a very hard taskmaster.

The one point on which I used to disagree with Winn Scott was his overworking his personnel and low-rating them on their fitness reports.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott maintained an accurate and thorough system of files in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. His file system was legendary. It was a thing of his own creation and did not really conform to the system which the Agency had devised. It was really much more intensive and his officers had to spend an awful lot of time

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Mr. Goldsmith. I have heard it said by several that Mr. Scott never even threw out any piece of paper. Everything was filed in the Mexico City Station.

Do you think that is an accurate statement?

I think that would be a figure of speech. Mr. Scelso. I think people would say, meaning that he never discarded any information that came in, that he attempted to have everything incorporated in the files, but it is inevitable in the intelligence business that you really cannot do this 100 percent.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would have happened to Mr. Scott's files after his death, to the Mexico City station's files after Mr. Scott's death? For example, would the files have been brought back?

Mr. Scelso. His personal files?

Mr. Goldsmith. Not his personal files. The files of the Mexico City station. He had this enormous record-keeping system and I would imagine -- I have no direct knowledge of this because I think -- I retired before he did. I am not sure of that, and I have no knowledge of that. Ordinarily, his retirement or death would have had no effect on it.

However, files overseas may be purged from time to time because of lack of space. Often they are sorted out, and a That could have been. lot of them sent home.

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